I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing difficulty (and cost) of expanding water resources and increasing urban and environmental demand for water are inducing changes in California's water policies. Agriculture accounts for 75 percent of all water used in the state. Farmers use traditional irrigation technol· ogies and apply much of this water to lands with relatively low-value crops, such as pasture and alfalfa. The challenge is to design viable and effective reforms that will divert water from agriculture to alternative uses. 1his paper explains exist ing patterns of California water use and evaluates the alternative reform mechanisms' potential to divert water away from agricultural to nonagricultural uses.
The paper describes California's exist ing water allocation mechanisms and de velops a theoretical argument identifying Abbftviation.
CVP: CentRI Valley Pro;ect ET: Evapotranspiration conditions under which transition to a market-like allocation system can improve social welfare and reduce agricultural water use without threatening agricultural viability. The potential for gains in effi ciency is much larger when all agricultural water users participate in the market ar rangement. Solutions advocating market like behavior for only some users have limited potential for economic gains.
II. WATEA ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN CAUFOANIA
Water allocation mechanisms deter mine water price and distribution to indi vidual users. In California, a myriad of water allocation arrangements have evolved. The analysis here considers only the most prevalent arrangements pertain ing to surface water. Including groundwa ter considerations would complicate the analysis without affecting the conclusions. The most important point is that the exist ing system does not yield an allocation pattern that would be achieved through a competitive market. That is to say, California's water allocation rules do not produce a market-clearing price that equates supply with demand. Instead, the rules generally are based. on a M queuing" system that disallows the transfer or trad ing of water rights.
In California, prior appropriation and, to a lesser extent, riparian rights doctrines determine rights to \'fater from" old" sources. These doctrines apply to most sources developed since the 19th century, except for state and federal water projects. According to Cuzon (1983) , two rules characterize prior appropriation: "first come, first served" and "use it or lose it." Following the prior-appropriation queue, farmers receive water rights according to whm they start diverting water. Although policy prevents users from transferring (selling) water, it does not restrict the amount of water they divert and allows them to use as much waterlQ.S they can put to beneficial use.
The riparian system in practice is an other queuing system but bases allocation on location. Growers located along a river or a stream can use as much water as they need to irrigate their fields, but they can not divert water away from the river. The riparian system initially appeared on the East Coast where the large number of riv ers made diverting water (ar from the river banks generally unnecessary. How ever, in the West, the relatively smaller number of rivers necessitates diverting much water with aqueducts. The West thus adopted the prior appropriation sys tem relying on historical rights as a guid ing principle. Burness and Quirk (1979) discuss advantages of efficiency gains as sociated with transition from a riparian rights to a prior appropriation system for water allocation based on a variation of the prior appropriation rules. Arguably, the existing water rights sys tem in the California Central Valley effec tively encouraged settlement and expan sion of the state's irrigated land base. Water allocation rules-particularly in the case of the prior appropriation doctrine are comparable to homesteading in en couraging settlement and land ownership. Allen (1991) demonstrates the economic rationale behind homesteading. One can use similar arguments to justify prior ap propriation rights. In the early stages of land settlement, prior appropriation rights enabled farmers to obtain water for a low price. Since the price was so low, farmers did not need to establish extensi.ve diver sion facilities and could invest in inputs other than water.
Land markets replaced homesteading once the West was settled and new land became unavailable. To date, no compara· ble transition has occurred with regard to water resources. One reason is because California reached land constraints before water constraints, and until recently water was abundant. Additionally, differences in the nature of land and water make estab· lishing water markets more difficult. Land is a tangible commodity characterized by its fixity. On the other hand, water's criti cal characteristic is its flow, which can be volatile. This characteristic makes vesting rights difficult and also complicates estab lishing mechanisms that produce market like outcomes. Furthermore, increasing re turns to scale in providing and managing water conveyance systems may lead to water supply monopolies. This pOSSibility suggests that regulated utilities or other publicly controlled organizations should ensure that water pricing is efficient and competitive.
Ill. THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION FROM WATER RIGHTS TO WATER MARKETS
Most California water allocation mech anisms tend to queue users, to restrict water transfer and water trading, and to charge prices that do not adequately re flect the water's scarcity value. Shah and Zilberman (1992) develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the economics of transition from queuing systems to water markets. The framework is especially ap plicable to the prior appropriation system. The analysis relies on Caswell and Zilberman's (1986) and Dinar and Zilberman's (1991) irrigation choice mod els. These models assume that agricultural production has a constant return to scale. Dinar and Zilberman (1991) curves are linear, corresponding to qua argue that modern technologies' yield-in dratic production functions that seem to creasing and water~saving effects are perform well in empirical studies of water likely to offset the higher investment costs productivity).
as water price becomes higher. Figure 2 Figure 1 suggests that when the price of . depicts profit per acre under both technol water relative to the price of output is ogies as a function of water price. When smaller than (w/p)l, profit-maximizing water price is smaller than WI, the tradi fanners use less water and realize more tional technology is more profitable; how~ output using modern rather than tradi ever, when water price is between WI and tional technology. When the price of water w 2 , the modern technology is more profit~ is high, modern technology may require able. Thus, farmers are more likely to more water but produces much more out adopt modem technologies when facing put than does the traditional technology.
higher water prices. Under both technologies, profit is the rev Under the prior appropriation system, enues minus water costs and fixed costs.
the farmer undertakes expense to move Suppose that the region has a given amount of water, A, and the total amount of agricultural acres is A/alt. Under the traditional technology in the prior appro priation system, yield-maximizing water use per acre detennines irrigated acreage from a given source. Water planners and irrigation experts refer to a crop's "water requirement." This level corresponds to aJ, i.n figure 1. Obviously, the higher the water requirement, the lower the acreage that a given water source can irrigate. In the past, each time the water capacity for 2 3
Water Price W W a given source was exhausted, the govern ment or a group of farmers exploited an other water source and distributed the water among fanners according to crop water requirements. That procedure led to the water system seen in many regions, especially in the East San Joaquin Valley. Water markets establish a water price. Fanners apply water at a level so that the value of marginal product of applied water is equal to water price. If water price is positive, then water use per acre de clines relative to the prior appropriation system where water price is zero. Thus, introducing water markets should in crease the amount of land that a given vol ume of regional water can serve. The in troduction of a water market may expand irrigated land to include all fann land in the region.
If only the traditional technology is available, water use per acre under the water market is equal to AIL (total waterI available land) and water price cor responds to point E in figure 2 (assuming that the price at E is the value of marginal product when water per acre is AIL). When more than one technology is avail able, different outcomes are possible. First, if the ratio AIL is relatively large and the resulting water price is smaller than w t in figure 2 , then all farmers use the tradi tional technology. Alternatively, when water is scarce and AIL is relatively small so that water price is greater than w 2 in figure 2, all farmers use the modem tech nology. A third possible outcome results when water price is between w t and w 2 in figure 2. In this case, some farmers adopt the modem technology, and others adopt the traditional technology. The marginal physical product of applied water is iden tical in both firms and is equal to (wi p)2 in figure 1. However, the traditional tech nology requires more water than does the modem technology. Obviously, using both technologies makes the quasi rent per acre (the difference between the revenue and water cost) equal under both technologies.
Farmers use only the traditional tech nology under the market when the water per acre ratio is relatively high and water use per acre is relatively close to ali. The efficiency gain associated with moving from water rights to a market system re sults from being able to cultivate more land with a given amount of water. That is, moving water that has a relatively low marginal productivity on the land used under the prior appropriation system to land that has not be utilized before in creases water productivity on this new land. (Alternatively, some excess water can be moved from agriculture and used in other activities having high marginal productivities). Adopting modern tech nology enhances water productivity of water even further but entails higher in vestment costs. If extra acreage beyond what was settled under the prior appro priation system is minimal, the productiv ity gain associated with adopting the modern technology may be so insignifi cant that adoption is unlikely. If the water per acre ratio is relatively small, farmers likely will apply the modem technology on aU land. In this case, the water price is relatively high, a large increase in output occurs, and water use per acre drastically declines. A middle solution may occur when a water market increases the land base but the productivity gain is not sufficient to justify completely adopting the modem technology. In this case, fanners use the modem technology on some land and the traditional technology on other land consis tent with market-dearing rules.
The analysis here suggests that transi tion from a water rights regime to a water market increases economic efficiency. This is true if the transition from one system to another does not entail adjustment costs. However, the prior appropriation system and the zero scarcity value of water it en tails permit establishing a very inexpen sive water conveyance system requiring little monitoring, especially if all land be longs to farmers who have water rights. Transition to a water market may require expanding conveyance systems, improv ing measuring and metering, and increas ing monitoring and protection of water flows. If the efficiency gain from operating the new system is smaller than the adjust ment costs of the transition, then the tran sition is not totally efficient. Indeed, lack of demand, low commodity prices, or a high initial water to land ratio may mean the amount of land that farmers optimally can utilize under a market is not much bigger than the amount they utilized under the prior appropriation system. In this case, the prior appropriation system is more efficient than a market, given tran sition costs. That may be why the system was established in the first place. Over time, as demand for commodities pro duced with water increases and their prices rise, or as adjustment costs improve due to better technology, water markets are likely to become more efficient, and one can justify transition.
With transition to a water market, the farmer who had a right to water under prior appropriation now must purchase it, perhaps from a government agency. Obvi ously, the farmer loses therefore likely op~ poses the transition. Ameliorating the sit uation may involve introducing "transfer able rights," which allow farmers with se nior rights to sell excess water to farmers whose land is not included under the prior appropriation system. Farmers with prior appropriation rights now benefit from the transition and are less likely to oppose it. Of course, exceptions exist. For example, if the elasticity of demand for the com modities produced by farmers is low, se nior rights owners may object that the transition would expand production, re duce output prices, and reduce their in come. Realistically, that probably is not the case. Such objections seem unlikely if ad justment costs associated with transition to a market system are sufficiently low and farmers enjoying senior rights under the existing regime are confident that they will be able to retain these rights, transfer water, and gain income. The California Farm Bureau is not opposed to introduc ing institutions like transferable rights. Shah and Zilberman (1992) base their numerical example on parameters from the California cotton industry and assume that relatively light soils and uneven land characterize the geography. Table 1 shows some of their results along with parameter values. Four irrigation technologies are available: furrow, shortened runs, sprink ler, and drip. The first two may be rela tively inefficient-especially at locations with sandy soils and uneven land-and are traditional technologies. The latter two are modem technologies having higher ir rigation efficiency and higher set-up and other fixed costs (table 1) .
The example uses a hypothetical case of a region with 3 million acre feet (MAP) of water. Computer simulations obtain input use and output allocations for both prior appropriation and market mechanisms.
Under the prior appropriation system, only 720,000 acres are utilized when out~ put price is $0.75/lb. This price and the corresponding queuing output serve as benchmark values around which demand elasticity varies from 1 to 50. If the adjust ment costs are relatively low ($5.00/ AF) and demand for cotton is elastic, transi tion to a water market permits utilizing the land in all cases, even when 1,100,000 acres are available. However, as the water/land ratio becomes smaller, the dominant technology in the region be comes more advanced. For instance, when the region has 1,050,000 acres of land and the demand elasticity for cotton is 50, farmers use sprinkler irrigation throughout the region. In this case, tran sition increases the irrigated land base by about 46 percent and social welfare by about 24 percent.
Demand elasticity is an important ele ment in this analysis. The higher the elas ticity, the greater the likelihood that farm ers utilize the more advanced technologies for a given amount of land, and the greater the benefit from transition to a wa ter mar~ ket system. Shah and Zilberman also show that even though adjustment costs are im portant from a conceptual standpoint, the level of costs that would make a transition to a water market system inefficient is sub stantial.
Shah and Zilberman elaborate on the case with zero adjustment costs. In the hy pothetical example, if water availability to the region declines by 25 percent and a transition occurs from water rights to a water market, the farmers' well-being under the water market is the same as under the prior appropriation system. Thus, great potential exists for transfer ring nonagricultural water without reduc ing farmers' well-being if the transfer also involves transition to a water market. Ob viously, the higher the transition's adjust ment costs, the less water is available for transfer away from agriculture. 
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Shah and Zilberman abstract from many issues. They consider only three technological alternatives to traditional ir rigation-short run, sprinkler.. and drip ignoring the great potential for water sav ings and yield increases associated with, for example, irrigation scheduJing. They do not consider crop substitution as a re· sponse to a high water price. A transition away (rom water-consuming crops to other crops that bring higher profits per acre foot of water also deserves consider ation. Nevertheless, Shah and Zilberman establish the potential gain from moving to a market system that overcomes the ineffi ciency of a prior appropriation system. Moreover, for 25 percent of the irrigators who use surface water, the allocation does not exactly follow the prior appropriation system. Those irrigators receive water from the state and federal water projects and are, in effect, water project contractors.
Water contractors, like prior appropria· tors, cannot trade their water, but period ically can renegotiate their contracts. In principle, contract prices were designed to repay project costs. While SWP prices are high (sometimes reaching $80 per acre foot), historically the CVP water has been cheap and highly subsidized. Some who receive water from the federal water proj ect have been unable to receive all the water they want at the subsidized prices. Moore et al. (1992) document that the shadow price of water used by the con tractors, at least in the late 1980s, was much higher than the price paid. Thus, federal and state water project contractors' behavior renects the positive price of water. Therefore, their water application per acre is lower and their water e((jciency is higher than are those of the prior appro priators who, in many cases, experienced water prices dose to zero.
Furthermore, water contractors' rights are junior to the prior appropriators' rights. Therefore, the contractors are further down the queue. Whenever a severe drought or water shortage occurs, the contractors' sup plies are more likely to be cut than are those of many farmers who are prior appropria· tors. For example, the 1990-1991 drought did not affect the supply of water to many prior appropriators while many contractors received. between 25 to 50 percent of their usual water allotment.
Much evidence suggest's that water project contractors use water more effi ciently than do prior appropriators. For example, the State Water Resources Con trol Board shows that in 1989, CVP-con tracting cotton growers in the Westlands Water District used about 20 percent less water and gained about 20 percent more output than did the Valley growers who likely are prior appropriators. Mac Dougall et aI. (1992) find that fanners in the Broadview Water District use 20 per· cent less water for the same yields as do nearby fanners in the Central California Irrigation District. Differences in land quality or other fanning conditions in the two regions are small. Therefore, higher water price led to the water savings. Fur thermore, some of the water districts like Broadview have introduced tiered pricing to encourage fanners to adopt modem ir rigation technologies and conserve water. Indeed, the first farmers to use drip irri gation in cotton production were state or federal project contractors. Similarly, water-project water recipients are more likely to adopt irrigation scheduling and other water·saving managerial practices.
Patterns of water transactions depend upon the participants in the water market. If trading is limited to agriculture, contrac tors will purchase water from prior appro priators. If the market includes urban sec tors, prior appropriators will be sellers, cities will be buyers, and contractors may be either buyers or sellers. If the environ ment is an autonomous player in the mar· ket with the capacity to purchase water, it also will be a water buyer. Understanding transaction patterns is especially impor· tant for analyzing the impact of new water quality regulations in California.
V. WATER MARKETS THAT REDUCE COSTS OF MEETING WATER OUAUTY GOALS
Concern for water quality in the San Francisco Bay and Delta is leading state and federal agencies to consider new water quality standards requiring diver sion of more water to environmental uses. Because environmental quality is a public good in the economic sense, the Mfree rider N problem is likely to cause un derprovision of private funds to purchase water for environmental purposes. There· fore, government intervention is needed. Current fiscal constraints prevent the gov· ernment from allocating funds to purchase water for environmental uses. Instead, the government has considered and enacted policies to divert some of the government· supplied water to environmental use. Government agencies also considered es tablishing new water quality standards re quiring more water diversion from agri cultural to environmental uses.
The recently enacted Central Valley Im provement Act (Bradley-Miller Bill) man dates reallocating 800,000 AF of CVP water from agricultural contractors so as to improve San Francisco Bay and Delta water quality. Allowing water transfer be tween the CVP contractors (and thus es tablishing a water market) complements this reallocation.
The act has the ingredients of a desir able reform. The efficiency gain associated with introducing markets will save some of the cost as with water supply reduction. This and similar proposals such as the de feated Johnston Bill calling for transfer of 2.5 MAF from the contractors to environ mental uses are relatively easy to imple ment because state and federal govern ments supply the water to contractors. However, such proposals have limited po tential for improving welfare. Contractors are likely to use water more efficiently than do prior appropriators. Contractors consume less than 30 percent of California surface water. Therefore, efficiency gains from introdUcing a water market solely among contractors are limited. If water is to be taken away from contractors, effi cient reform must establish a water market that includes all agricultural users-con tractors and prior appropriators. Indeed, policies that significantly reduce water supplied to contractors will be very costly outside an agricultural water market.
Zilberman et at (1993) use several ap proaches to estimate impacts on agricul tural income of reassigning water from CVP contractors to environmental uses while allOWing water trading between contractors. (Measuring impacts on eco nomic surplus may be more appropriate, but policymakers are interested in impacts on revenue and employment growth.) To find the upper bound on short term im pacts, Zilberman et al. consider that the response to water supply reduction will be fallOWing of land used with low-value crops. Figures 3, 4 , and 5 depict revenues per acre foot as a function of the cumula tive volume of water applied in three re gions receiving water from the Central Valley Project. The Westlands Water Dis trict and the Friant-Kern region are south of the Delta, and the Tehama-Colusa is north of the Delta. The figures show great variability in revenues associated with water used on different crops in different regions. Water used with high-value tree crops generates more than $1,000 per acre foot, but water used with low-value crops such as pasture and alfalfa generates very low revenues. Regions south of the Delta regions tend to generate, higher revenues per acre than does Tehama-Colusa, whose return structure resembles those of many prior appropriators located in the north east Central Valley.
The income reductions associated with reducing supply to CVP contractors is likely to be different if the reductions apply to all contractors or only to contrac tors south of the Delta. If the reform affects all contractors and allows trading between them, the 0.8 MAF reduction that the Bradley-Miller Bill calls for mostly will re duce acreage devoted to hay, irrigated pas ture, and rice, crops which generate less than $100/ AF. Restricting reductions to growers in Westlands and other nearby districts will reduce the coUon acreage that generates more than $250/AF in rev enues. Similarly, reducing 2.5 million AF of water among all Bureau contractors will reduce the fallowing of rice, sorghum, wheat, and hay acreage and some fallow ing of cotton. If the reduction applies only to contractors south of the Delta, most of the land for cotton will be fallowed as well as some land for almonds. Thus, extend ing the range of producers that the water supply reduction affects drastically re duces the economic implications. Zilberman et al. (1993) ley-Miller Bill will reduce their revenues by $50-$120 and will lose 2,000 to 4,000 man-years of employment annually. Fur thermore, reducing 2.5 MAF in agricul tural water supply to CVP water contrac tors would lead to an estimated annual revenue loss of between $400 million and $780 million and a loss of between 10,000 to 19,000 man-years of work. The impacts would be much less significant if the water transfer occurs in conjunction with the in troduction and encouragement of water transfers between regions and with the de velopment of new conveyance facilities to ensure efficient water use across the state.
Actually, transferring a substantial amount of water from agriculture to the environment in California, introducing transferrable rights, and creating an agri cultural water market may cause contrac tors to buy water and prior appropriators to adopt improved irrigation technologies and use less water more efficiently. Cali fornia agriculture uses about 20 MAP of surface water annually. The analysis here suggests that transferring 10 percent of this water from agriculture and introduc ing a water market (that is, allowing trans ferrable water rights) may not leave Cali fornia farmers worse off. Of course, such reform is complex and must address other issues, including managing groundwater and third-party effects as well as develop ing compensation mechanisms to ensure that none of the major parties in the state are big losers and that transition impacts are equitably divided.
